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Abstract 
One of the most important lessons of the global financial crisis has been the 
deep interconnectedness between the shadow banking system and the regular 
banking system. These two systems are linked through several channels, of 
which one of the most important is the financing provided by regular banks to the 
shadow banking system and vice versa. In addition, regular banks can originate 
loans that are securitized. Subsequently, part of the securitized instruments may 
remain on the balance sheet of the originating banks or be found on the balance 
sheet of other regular banks and shadow banking entities. These links between 
the two systems can increase contagion and systemic risks, which in turn may 
affect financial stability.  
The financial crisis has acutely revealed the negative effects these 
interconnections can generate. The interconnections are underestimated by the 
available data because of the difficulties in gathering information on the euro 
area. Within this context, our paper tries to evaluate and analyze the 
interconnections between the shadow banking system and the regular banking 
system within the euro area, both in the pre-crisis period and currently. Finally, 
some measures to regulate the interconnections between these two systems are 
raised.     
 







The global financial crisis revealed the negative consequences that the 
interconnections between banks and shadow banking entities have on financial 
stability. Moreover, the international dimensions of this interaction, more 
precisely the connections between the European banking system and the US 
shadow banking system, amplified the negative effects and propagated the crisis 
from the US to Europe. Against this background both researchers and regulators 
are interested in a better understanding of these interconnections in order to 
assess their size and find adequate measures to capture and manage the risks 
that this interaction raised.  
One problem in the assessment of the interconnections between regular 
banks and shadow banking entities is the difficulty in gathering data and, 
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sometimes, the lack of comparative data, due to the fact that there are various 
definitions for non bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Therefore, due to these 
limitations, we explicitly detail the definition used every time we present data.   
In the euro area, the quarterly euro area accounts (EAA) include most 
shadow banking activities under the heading “other financial intermediaries” 
(OFIs). The OFI category comprises all financial institutions apart from those 
included in monetary financial institutions (MFIs), insurance corporations, and 
pension funds. It is important to note that OFIs exclude money market funds 
(MMFs) that are shadow banking entities. 
In order to achieve our objectives, we organize our work in three sections. 
In the first one we analyze traditional banking and shadow banking from a 
comparative perspective. The second section presents and analyzes some data 
on the interconnections between regular banks and shadow banking entities in 
the euro area, but also in some other jurisdictions within Europe. Finally, we 
review some European regulatory measures that have been implemented in 
order to regulate the interconnections between banks and shadow banking 
entities.      
 
1. Traditional banking and shadow banking - a comparative 
perspective 
 
One of the main characteristics of the pre-crisis period was the 
development of a parallel banking system that was called shadow banking after 
having triggered the crisis. In the 20 years prior to the crisis, the US financial 
system was characterized by significant growth of non-bank credit intermediation. 
In other countries this phenomenon was not as obvious as in the US, but the 
banking systems of many countries had strong connections with the US shadow 
banking system via purchasing of credit securities, counterparties in derivative 
and repo markets, or the funding provided by the US shadow banking institutions 
(primarily the money market funds) (Turner 2011, p. 10).  
The speciality literature has not reached a consensus on the shadow 
banking definition. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) (FSB, 2011) defines 
shadow banking in two ways:  
• The broad definition: “credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside the regular banking system” (p.1). 
• The narrow definition:  “a system of credit intermediation that involves entities 
and activities outside the regular banking system, and raises (1) systemic risk 
concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and 
flawed credit risk transfer, and/or (2) regulatory arbitrage concerns” (p. 3).  
According to the recent data provided by the FSB, in the pre-crisis period, 
the global shadow banking system (SBS)1 grew from $26 trillion in 2002 to $62 
trillion in 2007. After a decrease in 2008, the level of the global SBS reached $67 
trillion in 2011. As indicated by the same report issued by the FSB, the aggregate 
                                                 
1
 As indicated by the FSB (2012a, p. 3), the global SBS are proxied by “Other Financial 
Intermediaries”. This category includes those financial institutions that are not: banks, central 
banks, public institutions, insurance companies, or pension funds. 
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size of the SBS in the period between 2009 and 2011represented about half the 
size of the banking system. It is important to note that even if the US has a very 
large SBS ($23 trillion in 2011), the SBS of the euro area ($22 trillion) is very 
close in size to the US SBS. Moreover, the SBS of the euro area combined with 
that of the UK ($9 trillion) is considerably larger than the US SBS (FSB, 2012a).  
The size of the SBS differs from country to country. An overall picture of 
the size of the OFI sector across the EU 27 is provided by chart 1. The UK, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have the largest SBS. At the same time, a lot 
of countries have a very small SBS (Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Greece etc.). Most of these countries are new EU 
countries. 
 
Chart 1. Size of the OFI sector across the EU 27 (December 2010, euros bn) 
Source: European Commission, Non-bank financial institutions: Assessment of their 
impact on the stability of the financial system, Economic Papers 472, 2012a, p. 11.  
 
Between traditional banking and shadow banking there are similarities and 
differences. Both traditional/regular banks and shadow banks perform credit 
intermediation. But while in traditional banking intermediation occurs under “the 
same roof” (Pozsar and al., 2010), in shadow banking intermediation occurs 
through a chain of entities. Therefore, operations are more complex in the 
shadow banking system than in the traditional banking system.  
A notable difference between the two financial systems refers to 
regulation. Unlike shadow banks that are unregulated or little regulated, 
traditional banks are strictly regulated and supervised. Due to these constraints, 
regulated banks have access to central bank funding and deposit insurance 
schemes. Insured deposits are the main funding source for regulated banks. On 
the contrary, shadow banking is based on wholesale funding. The different 
sources of funding give also the differences in how panics materialize. The 
classical run on deposits manifests itself in traditional banking while a run on 
repos etc. is specific to the shadow banking system.  
Traditionally, banks grant loans and hold them on their balance sheets 
until maturity (originate to hold model). Through securitization on the other hand, 
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loans are sold and converted into securities (originate to distribute model). Apart 
from the systemic risk concern, shadow banking can be used to divert activities 
from the regulated financial segment to the unregulated segment (the regulatory 
arbitrage concern).  
The development of shadow banking has raised a range of concerns for 
global regulators and supervisors. The FSB (2011a, p. 3) notes the systemic risk 
and regulatory arbitrage that shadow banking may pose. Besides these risks, the 
European Commission (2012, p. 5) also underlines the cross-jurisdictional reach 
of risks created by shadow banking entities and activities. 
In this respect, the ICMA European Repo Council (2012, pp. 9-10) 
outlined a number of issues related to: 
- the size of shadow banking; 
- the regulatory gaps and the possibility of regulatory arbitrage; 
- the problems associated with misalignments in the securitization 
process;   
- the interconnections between shadow banking and traditional banking; 
- the lack of transparency, due to the complexity of operations; 
- the mispricing of risks;   
- the possibility of allowing over-leveraging; 
- the possibility of amplifying pro-cyclicality. 
 
2. Connections between the banking system and shadow banking. 
Evidence from Europe 
 
One of the lessons of the global financial crisis was the 
interconnectedness between the shadow banking system and the regular 
banking system, which can affect financial stability.  
According to the FSB (2011), the main channels that feed the 
interconnections between the two banking systems are: 
- regular banks may be part of the chain of the SBS; 
- regular banks can provide support to the SBS through temporary 
exposures (warehousing), provision of funds, contingent credit lines; 
- regular banks can invest in financial products issued by the SBS; 
- regular banks can be funded by money market mutual funds or other 
entities that are part of the SBS.  
Apart from the direct channels of contagion, the risks taken by the shadow 
banks can spread to regular banks via indirect channels, such as the massive 
sale of assets that could cause the decrease of prices of financial and real assets 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 6). 
As stressed by the FSB (2012a, p. 20), the interconnectedness between 
banks and shadow banking entities (or non-bank financial intermediaries, NBFIs) 
can be measured by using the following indicators: banks’ credit exposures to 
shadow banking entities and banks’ dependence on funding from shadow 
banking entities (and vice versa). From this perspective, according to the FSB’s 
findings, there are differences between financial systems taken into consideration 
in the 2012 global monitoring exercise of shadow banking.  
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Only in the Netherlands and the UK, is banks’ credit exposure to NBFIs 
relatively large (ratios of banks’ assets to NBFIs are above 10% of banks’ total 
assets). Regarding banks’ dependence on funding from NBFIs, note that the 
Netherlands and the UK are the jurisdictions that depend most on funding from 
NBFIs (the left- hand chart 2).    
 










Source: FSB, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012, 2012a, p. 22. 
 
The data provided by the same report reveals that the interconnections 
between the two sectors present greater risks to NBFIs compared to banks 
(right-hand chart 2).  
This latter development is also consistent with other financial systems like 
the Romanian financial system, even if it is dominated by credit institutions and 
the SBS in that country is not large (chart 3).  
 




















However, in the pre-crisis period, non-bank financial institutions did 
develop in Romania. Total net assets of non-bank financial institutions 
represented 8.4 percent of GDP (at end-2008) (NBR, Financial Stability Report 
2009, p. 57).  
But, according to the National Bank of Romania (NBR) data (NBR, 
Financial Stability Report 2012, p. 76), beginning with 2008 Q4 the activity of 
these institutions deteriorated (the crisis manifested itself in Romania with a small 
lag compared to the more  developed countries). The worsening of the loan 
portfolio and dependence on external funding are among the main vulnerabilities 
of non-bank financial institutions. 
It is worth mentioning that the great part of non-bank financial institutions 
is subject to prudential supervision by the NBR (92 percent of total assets of the 
sector, NBR, Financial Stability Report 2012, p. 76).  
The interaction between credit institutions and non-bank financial 
institutions has been reduced. In June 2012, credits granted by credit institutions 
to non-bank financial institutions accounted for 1.5 percent of total credit to non-
government. At the same time, 15 percent of total borrowings of non-bank 
financial institutions were provided by credit institutions. Nevertheless, from the 
interconnection perspective, a reason for concern is the fact that non-bank 
financial institutions are above all entities affiliated to credit institutions and the 
worsening of the activity of non-bank financial institutions affects the entire group 
through reputational risk (NBR, Financial Stability Report 2012, p. 79).  
Similar observations are also valid for another new EU country, Poland. 
According to the National Bank of Poland (NBP), the connections of non-bank 
financial institutions with banks in Poland are limited. Deposits placed by NBFIs 
(investment funds, pension funds, and insurance companies) constituted 5 
percent of the total amount of deposits (at the end of September 2012). At the 
same period, loans granted to these entities compared to total bank loans 
represented only 0.7 percent (NBP 2012, p. 77).  
A picture of interactions between shadow banking and traditional banking 
in the euro area is provided by Bakk-Simon et al (2012). Deposits and loans 
between MFIs (which include banks) and OFIs represent a useful indicator to 
assess the interconnections of OFIs with the regulated banking system. 
According to Bakk-Simon et al (2012, p. 21) based on euro area accounts source 
in the euro area, deposits and loans between MFIs and OFIs grew from around 
12% of the total at the beginning of 2000 to around 23% in the second quarter of 
2011 (Chart 4a). 
It is important to note that the intra-financial institutions’ activities 










Chart 4. Intra-financial institutions’ assets/liabilities: deposits and loans between  
MFIs and OFIs (the euro area) 
 
Source: Bakk-Simon et al., Shadow Banking in the Euro Area: An Overview, European Central 
Bank, Occasional Paper Series no. 133, 2012, p. 21. 
Note: Excluding interbank deposits  
 
The interconnection between traditional banking and shadow banking also 
manifests itself when regular banks invest in securitized products. From this 
perspective in Europe, securitized products were mainly retained in bank balance 
sheets between 2008 and 2010:  
• 2008 – 99% of total issued volumes,  
• 2009 – 98%,  
• 2010 – 79% (chart 5).  
This development is likely due to the fact that securitized products are 




































Source: ECB, Recent Developments in Securitisation, European Central Bank, February 
2011, p. 11. 
 
A trend in the business models developed by many European banks in the 
pre-crisis period was the growth of dependence on other sources of funding than 
classical deposits, among them securitization. Banks resorted to these sources 
of funding in order to finance their increased loans.  
However, there were differences between countries and institutions. 
Sometimes, deposits represented up to 85 percent of banks’ total liabilities in 
countries with less mature financial markets. On the contrary, they accounted for 
only about 30-50 percent of banks’ total liabilities in countries with more 
developed financial markets (ECB, 2009, p. 10).    
Between 2000 and 2007, European securitization issuance grew from 
78.2 billion euros to 453.7 billion euros (table 1). This growth was significant but, 
comparatively, issuance in the US grew from a total of 1,088 billion euros in 2000 
to 2,455.8 in 2006 and 2,147.1 in 2007.  
Starting with 2009, European issuance decreased, down to 372 billion 
euros in 2011. The same declining trend of issuance was also noted in the US 
from 2006 until 2011, where issuance dropped to 1,013.7 billion euros 










Table 1. European Securitization issuance 
Billion euros 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
2000 14.1 16.4 21.4 26.3 78.2 
2001 20.5 43.2 22.7 66.2 152.6 
2002 24.3 42.6 35.7 55.1 157.7 
2003 43.3 51.9 39.7 82.4 217.3 
2004 55.8 59.0 53.2 75.5 243.5 
2005 47.8 94.4 41.5 143.3 327.0 
2006 69.0 114.3 112.8 184.9 481.0 
2007 128.7 152.0 98.3 74.7 453.7 
2008 40.0 169.5 134.1 367.6 711.1 
2009 123.2 81.2 114.7 94.9 414.1 
2010 75.5 32.2 111.5 163.6 382.9 
2011 114.6 67.1 53.8 136.4 372.0 
2012 59.3 67.6   126.9 
Source: AFME/ESF, Securitisation Data Report Q2: 2012, p. 4, available at 
http://www.afme.eu/Divisions/Securitisation.aspx. 
 
Regarding European issuance by type of collateral employed, in 2011 the 
most widely used securitized assets were residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), which accounted for 224.1 billion euros (out of a total of 372 billion 
euros), followed by asset backed-securities (ABS) (73.5 billion euro). In 2011, the 
UK (99.5 billion euros), the Netherlands (85.6 billion euros), and Spain (61.7 
billion euros) were the countries with the largest amount of issuance (AFME/ESF 
2012).  
It is worth noting that, as indicated in the chart 2, the UK and the 
Netherlands are also the countries with the greatest bank credit exposure to 
NBFIs.      
An overall image of the European issuance by collateral type and country 
of collateral (2012: Q2) is provided in table 2. Regarding the value of issuance, 
the Netherlands (22.2 billion euros) and the UK (20.8 billion euros) are 
significantly greater than the other countries, with Italy far behind (7.6 billion 
euros), France (5.1 billion euros) and Belgium (4.1 billion euros).  
Euro area banks at present rely more on short-term funding from shadow 
banking entities than in the past, which can lead to runs (Bakk-Simon et al, 2012, 
p. 4). The repo market played an important role in funding traditional banks 
during the crisis (ICMA European Repo Council, 2012, p. 3)    
The important role of repos in the development of the shadow banking 
activities in the pre-crisis period was underlined by the FSB (2011a, p. 22): 
1) repos allowed securitization instruments to be used as collateral for 
funding; 
2) the use of repos was considered a low-risk and short-term secured 
form of funding. 
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Table 2. Issuance by collateral type and country of collateral (2012: Q2) 
Billion euros 
 ABS CDO CMBS RMBS SME WBS Total 
Belgium     4.1  4.1 
Denmark       0.0 
France 3.9   1.2   5.1 
Germany 1.5      1.5 
Greece    1.3 0.6  2.0 
Ireland 0.3   0.9   1.2 
Italy 1.5   4.7 1.4  7.6 
Netherlands 0.7  0.6 20.9   22.2 
Portugal       0.0 
Spain    1.6   1.6 
UK 5.9  0.4 13.5  1.0 20.8 
PanEurope    0.2   0.2 
Other Europe 0.8      0.8 
Multinational  0.5     0.5 
European Total 14.7 0.5 1.0 44.2 6.2 1.0 67.6 
Sources: AFME/ESF, Securitisation Data Report Q2: 2012, p. 5, available at 
http://www.afme.eu/Divisions/Securitisation.aspx. 
 
3. Regulatory measures related to interconnections between shadow 
banking and traditional banking  
 
Finding possible measures to regulate shadow banking activities and 
entities became a priority for global regulators only after the adoption of the Basel 
III framework for the traditional banking system.  
In this respect, the G20 leaders asked the FSB to issue some 
recommendations to regulate the SBS at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. 
Since then, the FSB has issued several documents related to the oversight and 
regulation of shadow banking, among which it is important to note the report 
issued in October 2011 (FSB, 2011a) proposing initial recommendations for 
enhancing the regulation of the SBS, as well as the document issued in 
November 2012 (FSB, 2012) containing the FSB’s integrated overview on 
recommendations regarding strengthening oversight and the regulation of 
shadow banking.  
In October 2011, the FSB proposed five workstreams in order to enhance 
the regulation of the SBS: 
1) the first one is an indirect regulation and refers to the regulation 
of the interactions (interconnections) between banks and 
shadow banking entities; 
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2) the regulation of money market funds (MMFs); 
3) the regulatory framework for other shadow banking entities; 
4) the measures to regulate securitization; 
5) the regulatory framework of securities lending and repos (FSB, 
2011a, pp. 4-5). 
Subsequently, for each of the five above-mentioned workstreams, the FSB 
outlines some recommendations.  
The first recommendation, related to the regulation of banks’ linkages with 
shadow banking entities, refers to consolidation rules for prudential purposes. 
These rules are meant to ensure that any shadow banking entity that a bank 
sponsors is included on its balance sheet positions in order to be taken into 
account when calculating risk-based capital, leverage ratios, and liquidity ratios.   
The goal of the second recommendation is to limit the exposure of banks 
towards shadow banking entities.   
The FSB’s third recommendation considers the capital requirements for 
bank exposure to shadow banking entities. In order to better capture risks, the 
FSB requires special attention to treatment of investment in funds and treatment 
of short-term liquidity facilities for shadow banking entities other than 
securitization vehicles.  
Finally, the last recommendation within the recommendations on bank 
interconnections with shadow banking entities refers to treatment of banks’ 
implicit support to shadow banking entities (FSB, 2011a, pp. 16-20).  
With regard to the regulation of shadow banking activities through 
banking, the EU addressed securitization issues through amendments to Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD). The CRD II (the 2009 revision of Capital 
Requirements Directive) has taken two important measures: (1) it imposed 
originators and sponsors of securitized assets to retain a part of their risks; and 
(2) it improved the regulatory treatment of liquidity line and credit exposure to 
securitization vehicles. The CRD III (the 2010 amendments to Capital 
Requirements Directive) strengthened capital requirements for complex re-
securitisation. Additional disclosure rules have been imposed to banks when 
investing in complex re-securitisation too. The CRD III has also taken into 
consideration reputational risks arising from complex securitization structures or 
products. The CRD IV proposes harmonized requirements for liquidity 
(comprising liquidity facilities for SPVs) (European Commission, 2012, p. 8). 
These measures adopted in the EU are in line with the measures adopted 
within the Basel framework and the FSB recommendations.  
The same document issued by the European Commission (2012, p. 11) 
reveals some issues regarding bank exposures to shadow banking entities that 
need to be investigated further: (1) whether the banking legislation related to the 
large exposure regime properly addresses all shadow banking exposures; (2) the 
modality to account for leverage investment funds; (3) whether the CRD II 
regulatory treatment of liquidity lines and credit exposures for securitization 
vehicles need to be applied to other shadow banking entities. In the European 
Commission’s view, the implementation of the national supervisory treatment in 
the case of implicit support needs to be reviewed.  
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Some of these workstreams are consistent with those that the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is currently developing. In order to 
improve the resilience of the traditional banking sector against the risks arising 
from the interaction with the SBS, the BCBS is developing some policy 
recommendations in the following areas: (i) improvement of the scope of 
consolidation in order to diminish regulatory arbitrage; (ii) development of a large 
exposure regime that captures the risks arising from the SBS; (iii) regulatory 
treatment of bank investment in the equity of funds (FSB, 2012, pp. 5-6). 
 
Conclusions 
One widespread concern regarding the development of shadow banking 
refers to the contagion channels between the SBS and the regular banking 
system. Under stress conditions, these channels can propagate the crisis from 
one system to another system and can affect financial stability and, 
subsequently, the real economy.  
These channels can be direct (regular banks originate loans that are 
securitized; regular banks are part of the SBS chain of intermediation; regular 
banks invest in securitized products; they offer funding and guarantees to 
shadow banking entities) and indirect, through reputational risk or fire sales.  
Interaction between regular banks and shadow banking entities can take 
place at the national level, but also between entities located in different countries. 
The crisis highlighted the international dimension of these interconnections. 
European banks invested in US structured products or were financed by US 
MMFs, contributing to the propagation of the crisis globally. 
Recent FSB data suggest that the SBS of the euro area, combined with 
the UK SBS, is considerably larger than the US SBS. The size of the SBS differs 
from country to country; the UK has the largest SBS in Europe. In recent years 
the interconnections between regular banks and shadow banking entities have 
increased in the euro area. Because of data scarcity, this study is only a step 
towards the assessment of interconnections between regular banks and shadow 
banking entities at the European level. Efforts are being made to improve our 
research with data regarding bank exposure to NBFIs from other European 
countries.  
Securitization is smaller in Europe than in the US and the most popular 
type of collateral are RMBS. The Netherlands and the UK are the main European 
issuers, being, with Italy and France far behind. At present, securitized products 
are mostly retained in banks’ balance sheets for use as collateral for Eurosystem 
credit operations.  
Increased interconnections between regular banks and shadow banking 
entities raise concerns for regulators who are trying to find appropriate measures 
to monitor this interaction. The FSB has an important role in formulating 
recommendations to regulate the links between banks and shadow banking 
entities.  
Retention requirements, increased transparency, and greater capital 
requirements for complex re-securitization are among the main measures that 
have been taken at the European level through amendments to the Capital 
13 
 







Adrian, Tobias, Adam Ashcraft, Hayley Boessky, Zoltan Pozsar, Shadow 
Banking, Revue D’Économie Financière n. 105, 2012. 
AFME/ESF, Securitisation Data Report Q2: 2012. 
Bakk-Simon et al, Shadow Banking in the Euro Area: An Overview, European 
Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series no. 133, 2012. 
BCBS, Report on Special Purpose Entities, 2009. 
ECB, Recent Developments in Securitisation, 2011. 
ECB, Banks’ funding structures and policies, 2009. 
European Commission, Green Paper Shadow Banking, Brussels 19.3.2012, 
COM (2012) 102 final. 
European Commission, Non-bank financial institutions: Assessment of their 
impact on the stability of the financial system, Economic Papers 472, 
2012a.  
FSA, Prudential Risk Outlook 2011, Financial Services Authority, 2011. 
FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking. An Integrated 
Overview of Policy Recommendations (Consultative Document), 2012. 
FSB, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012, 2012a. 
FSB, Strengthening the Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, 2012b. 
FSB, Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability 
Issues, 2012c. 
FSB, Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues, Financial Stability Board, 2011. 
FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation, 2011a.  
Gorton, Gary, Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, Yale 
ICF Working Paper No. 09-14, November 2010. 
Gorton, Gary, Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, SSRN, 
October 2010a. 
Gorton, Gary, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic 
of 2007, SSRN, May 2009. 
ICMA European Repo Council, Shadow Banking and Repo, 2012. 
Jeffers, Esther, Jean-Paul Pollin, Déréglementation Bancaire des Années 1980 
et Crise Financière, Revue D’Économie Financière. n. 105, 2012. 
McCulley, Paul, Teton Reflections: PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus, PIMCO, 
September 2007.  
NBP (National Bank of Poland), Financial Stability Report. December 2012. 
Available at http://www.nbp.pl/en/systemfinansowy/fsr201212.pdf. 
NBR (National Bank of Romania), Financial Stability Report, various issues.  
Nijdam, Christophe, Le Shadow Banking, Appendice Opaque du Système 
Bancaire Regulé, Analyse Financière n. 41, 2011. 
Pozsar, Zoltan and Manmohan Singh, The Non-Bank-Bank Nexus and the 
Shadow Banking, IMF Working Paper 11/289, 2011. 
Pozsar, Zoltan, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft and Hayley Boesky, Shadow 
Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 458, 2010. 
Ricks, Morgan, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation, Columbia Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 370, August 30, 2010. 
15 
 
Schwarcz, Steven, Regulating Shadow Banking, Innaugural Address, Boston 
University Review of Banking & Financial Law, Innaugural Symposium: 
„Shadow Banking”, February 24, 2012. 
Turner, Adair, Leverage, Maturity Transformation and Financial Stability: 
Challenges beyond Basel III, speech at Cass Business School, 16 March 
2011. 
 
 
